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Abstract: This paper argues that much contemporary thought 
about practical reasons is saddled with a questionable 
assumption. The assumption is that practical reasons owe their 
normative force to their metaphysical nature; or in other words, 
that "practical reason" is a metaphysical kind. This assumption 
is traced to an implicit foundationalism in views of practical 
reasons, which is itself a response to the threat of a form of 
skepticism: some practical reason must be able to stop a regress 
of practical reasons, on pain of there being no reasons for action 
at all. However, foundationalism about practical reasons, with 
its implicit commitment to practical reasons as a metaphysical 
kind, is not the only way to halt the skeptical threat. A 
contextualist alternative is sketched and some reasons are 
offered to prefer it. 
Much ink has been spilled in the last thirty years or so debating 
the nature and source of our reasons to act—our practical reasons. 
A slow revolt against once-hegemonic instrumental theories has 
sparked new creativity among Humeans, Kantians, Aristotelians, 
and others. Virtually all of these views, however, share a common 
assumption, or perhaps better, a common picture of the form an 
answer must take. In this picture, our reasons to act are grounded 
in some kind of thing, which by its very nature provides us those 
reasons. More specifically, it is commonly assumed that there is 
some metaphysical kind appropriately labeled "pract ical 
reasons"—the debate, then, is a battle over which kind this is, and 
what its properties are. Do our reasons spring from contingent, 
subjective desire, or from the Form of the Good? Are they found 
in normatively loaded value, or ordinary natural fact? Is the source 
of our reasons subjective or objective? Agent-relative or agent-
neutral? Necessary or contingent? On this picture, practical thought 
begins with metaphysics. 
Auslegung, Vol. 27, No. 1 
48 AUSLEGUNG 
This underlying framework lies buried so deeply in the 
philosophical consciousness that it only rarely comes to light in 
discussion. Yet it is not a very sophisticated way to think about 
reasons, practical or otherwise. Moreover, it restricts the options 
for understanding practical reasons—and in my opinion, restricts 
them so as to rule out the truth. 
The goal of this essay is to expose an embedded prejudice: the 
assumption, effectively, that practical reasons are a metaphysical 
kind. Perhaps exposure, and the provision of an attractive 
alternative, are enough to do the prejudice in. At the very least, 
though, they shift a certain onus of proof: the role of metaphysics 
in practical thinking needs reexamination. 
The Question 
The debate I hope to clarify deals, as I said, with the nature 
and source of our reasons for acting. It's not exactly clear what 
questions are being asked, however, and unfortunately, few 
philosophers have made any attempt at clarification. To get some 
handle on the discussion, I'll point out ways in which competing 
claims get phrased. Frequently, claims are put in terms of sources 
of reasons (emphases added in all quotes): 
On Internalist theories, the source of all reasons is something 
that is not itself normative.... On Externalist theories, the source 
of any reason is something normative.' 
To begin with, such states are not, as desires are supposed to 
be, original sources of reasons? 
Other times, claims are made about what grounds or provides or 
generates a reason for acting, or what reasons are based on: 
The question underlying this debate is whether moral obligations 
that take a categorical form can provide good reasons for action.3 
Suppose, for example, that the reason generated by a desire is 
the fact that one has the desire4 
Foundationalism and the Metaphysics of Practical Reasons 49 
This distinction [between desire-based and value-based 
normative reasons] is much harder to characterize, since there 
has been no authoritative discussion of it. The desire-based view 
seems to be that all normative reasons are 'provided' by desires 
of the agent, while the value-based view is that some reasons, 
at least, are provided by ('grounded in') values such as the value 
of achievement, of pleasure, of friendship, or whatever. As such, 
these two views seem to be about the metaphysical groundfor 
a reason—about what creates or generates it.7 
What is a "source" of reasons? A "ground"? What does it mean 
to "provide" a reason? The very obscurity of these questions, so 
infrequently addressed, is a datum. A concept which everyone feels 
comfortable invoking, but which no one can explain, is basic to a 
way of looking at a subject. At issue, fundamentally, is the question 
of why we have the reasons for action that we do. When Dancy 
tracks down the central issue of debate, he reveals the underlying 
assumption: reasons for action derive from a metaphysical root. 
Later in the essay I will suggest a different way of framing the 
debate, and a diagnosis of why it tends to get framed in the terms 
it does. 
Let me quickly canvass the most common ways of offering an 
answer to this question. For a long time, the dominant view was 
that subjective attitudes grounded or provided our reasons to act. 
On one common view, the only justifications for agents' actions 
are gmunded in their wants and desires.5 
The hallmark of what are now called Humean theories of 
practical rationality is the assertion that "reason is ... the slave 
of the passions"—that reasons are based, ultimately, on 
subjective, contingent, conative states of the agent.6 
We could multiply examples like these indefinitely. 
One of the few authors to actually frame the relevant question 
explicitly, and make some attempt to clarify it, is Jonathan Dancy. 
When he does manage to shed light on it to some extent, the 
metaphysical twist to the question becomes plain: 
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(From now on I'll refer to these attitudes as 'desires', though that 
stretches the term.) The view is often called Humean, though it's 
doubtful Hume ever held such a position.8 The view is quite clear 
in Hobbes, however: 
But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire 
that it is which he for his part calleth good; and the object of his 
hate and aversion, evil;... For these words of good, evil... are 
ever used with relation to the person that useth them, there being 
nothing simply and absolutely so, nor any common rule of good 
and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves9 
David Gauthier provides a contemporary rendition of it: 
Value, then, we take to be a measure of individual preference— 
subjective because it is a measure of preference and relative 
because it is a measure of individual preference. What is good 
is good ultimately because it is preferred, and it is good from 
the standpoint of those and only those who prefer it.1 0 
Because the view that our reasons to act are given by desires 
was (and is) widely, if perhaps incorrectly, associated with Hume, 
all views differing from this long-dominant one get lumped together 
as anti-Humean. Also, virtually all anti-Humeans invoke "value" 
as the thing the Humeans leave out. However, there are two quite 
different notions of value in play in the anti-Humean camp, 1 1 and 
hence two quite different anti-Humean answers to the question of 
what provides reasons to act. 
The first, more traditional view holds that the world contains 
intrinsically normative entities or properties—values or goods. 
When we say that democracy is a good form of government, or 
that friendship is a value, we speak the literal, uncomplicated truth. 
I shall, with only partial jus t ice , call this broad posit ion 
Aristotelianism, though varieties of it range from Plato's semi-
mysticism to Aristotle's functional approach to the sophisticated 
contemporary versions of David Brink and John McDowell. The 
common mark of these theories is to suppose that the intrinsically 
normative entities or properties—the goodness of democracy, or 
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the value of friendship—give us reasons to act; for instance, to 
promote democracy around the world, or to maintain our 
friendships. 
The second anti-Humean construal of value, instead of seeking 
to ground reasons for action in value, defines value in terms of 
reasons for action. Thomas Scanlon helpfully dubs this more recent 
view the "buck-passing" view of value. On this account, something 
has value (is good) if it has some feature which gives us a reason 
to take action. 1 2 The reason, in this case, is some natural fact: e.g. 
that she is stranded on the side of the road gives me a reason to 
assist her; that he is engaged in criminal activity gives me a reason 
to report him to the police. Scanlon, who endorses this position, 
calls it the "buck-passing" view because the concept of value does 
no independent work; value just "passes the buck" to the feature 
which gives us the reason for action. Calling something valuable 
is just a way of saying that it has a certain kind of reason-giving 
feature. 
Each of these candidate answers identifies a metaphysical kind 
as the ground of practical reasons. For the Humeans, the kind is 
psychological states of desire. These and only these provide reasons 
to act. For the Aristotelians, value, goodness, or some other 
normative property provides the reasons. For the buck-passers, 
the metaphysical type that provides practical reasons is simply the 
natural world itself.13 
Recasting the Question 
Now that we understand something of the possible answers to 
the debate over the nature and source of our practical reasons, I'd 
like to revisit the debate itself. As near as we could tell, it hinged 
on a dispute over, in Dancy's words, "the metaphysical ground for 
a reason ... what creates or generates it." This language of 
fertility—"creating" or "generating" reasons—is none too clear, 
and so long as we rest content with it, the exact question we are 
trying to answer remains mired in obscurity. I believe the question 
can be made precise, but only by dropping the metaphysical 
baggage currently in tow. That is, when we have a clear grasp of 
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what is being asked, when we ask about the nature and source of 
our practical reasons, we will not need to have recourse to a 
"metaphysical ground." 
The first point of clarification concerns the relation between 
what provides a reason, and the reason it provides. Take a simple 
example. Suppose my grandmother is coming to stay and I have 
promised my parents I'll keep her happy while she visits. We might 
say that what gives me a reason to keep my grandmother happy 
while she stays with me is that I promised my parents I would. 
Now, according to this example, "that I promised to do it" gives 
me, or provides, or grounds, or is the source of, a reason to keep 
my grandmother happy. But what reason does it give me? The 
only way to describe the reason I have for keeping my grandmother 
happy seems to be, that I promised to do it. 
So the locutions, 'gives a reason' or 'grounds a reason' or 
'provides a reason,' are misleading. It is not as if one thing provides 
a reason, and a second thing is the reason. Rather, the grounds or 
sources or providers of reasons just are reasons, albeit of a certain 
privileged kind. 1 4 
When we go on to ask which sort of reasons they are, and 
what privilege they enjoy, we move to a second point of 
clarification. The special status accorded these grounding reasons 
comes out when we concentrate on the role that they play in 
practical reasoning. 
Practical reasoning occurs in at least two contexts, justificatory 
and deliberative. Whenever we try to justify a past or future 
intended action, we cite reasons for it. These reasons will be 
inferentially related to the action; they will be premises in an 
argument which concludes in the action to be justified. For instance, 
when asked why I brought my grandmother a cup of tea, I may 
reply that I wanted to keep my grandmother happy and, since she 
is fond of tea, I could do that by bringing her some tea. The 
argument corresponding to this reasoning, of course, is 
Let me keep my grandmother happy. 
If I bring her some tea. I will keep mv grandmother happy. 
So, I'll bring my grandmother some tea. 
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The other context is deliberation, or more generally trying to 
figure out what to do. Perhaps I want to keep my grandmother 
happy; how can I do this? Here, naturally, the same argument 
presents itself. 
Corresponding to these two contexts in which practical 
reasoning surfaces are two sorts of doubt or worry. In the 
justificatory context, we might wonder whether my desire to keep 
my grandmother happy should count as a justification, that is, as a 
good reason for doing anything at all. Are we quite sure that this 
desire was worth acting on? 
Likewise, in the deliberative context, I might wonder whether 
my desire to keep my grandmother happy, and the fact that bringing 
her some tea would keep her happy, are really good reasons for 
doing anything. After all, is it right to so supinely cater to my 
grandmother's every whim? Again, is my desire a worthy one? 
Answering these parallel questions puts us on a regress. 
Whatever reasons I offer for wanting to keep my grandmother 
happy, similar questions may arise about those reasons. If we cannot 
halt this regress somehow, we are in for skepticism about practical 
reasons: it will seem undeniable that nothing, in fact, genuinely 
gives us a reason to act. To stop the regress, what wc need is a real 
practical reason. Perhaps, in the present case, the regress-stopper 
could be supplied by, "I promised my parents I'd keep my 
grandmother happy" as a reason for wanting to please my 
grandmother. Just here is the privilege accorded grounding 
reasons—they halt regresses of practical argument. 
The special role of these grounding reasons is a role in practical 
reasoning. What practical reasons are for is for serving as premises 
in practical arguments and practical reasoning, in the justificatory 
context, the deliberative context, or some other context where 
argument or reasoning is appropriate. 1 5 What the special kind of 
practical reasons are for—the kind we sometimes misleadingly 
say "give" or "provide" us reasons to act—is for stopping a regress 
of such arguments. They are reasons for which no further reasons 
are needed. 
Now, it isn't obvious that what is meant by "a source of 
practical reasons" is "a regress-stopper," so we should pause and 
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ask whether what we have found is what we were looking for. The 
metaphors of "source" and "ground" bespeak an indistinct grasp 
of the issue, I claim, and are rendered literal when we take them to 
describe regress-stoppers for practical arguments. The picture is 
this: when an offered reason needs a further reason to back it up, 
it's not a font of normative force, as it were, but a channel. Just 
because it needs backing up by a further reason, the normative 
force of the offered reason draws from some other source, namely, 
the back-up reason, or whatever its source of normative force is. 
Whereas when a reason doesn't need backing up, it generates, or 
provides, or grounds, or gives us, normative force all by itself. 
Thus the function of halting regresses of practical argument is 
pictured with the images of source and ground. 
Once we have identified a practical reason of whatever sort, 
there is of course no harm in doing descriptive metaphysics. Is it a 
desire, or a value, or a proposition, or what?—this is perfectly 
innocuous and reasonable question. Descriptive metaphysics hasn't 
been the goal of all those philosophers who have debated the source 
of practical reasons, however. They have generally sought to 
identify a certain privileged class of reasons for acting, and to 
understand what that privilege consists in. We have done that 
without (yet) invoking any metaphysical categories. The privilege 
is constituted by a certain function—a role within practical 
reasoning—rather than by the nature of what has the function. Of 
course, a reason might come to have this function only in virtue of 
its nature; that, however, would be a substantive thesis. It is, in 
fact, the substantive—and I believe, mistaken—thesis shared by 
nearly all current answers to the question about the nature and 
source of our practical reasons. 
Foundationalism about Practical Reasons 
My contention is that the three theories of what gives us our 
practical reasons are competing forms of foundationalism about 
practical reasons. To understand this claim and its implications, 
I'll need to explain what foundationalism about practical reasons 
amounts to. 
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A foundation is a justifier which itself needs no justification— 
a reason (for believing, or acting, or anything else) which does not 
itself require reasons. If we understand the debate over the nature 
and source of our reasons for acting to be a debate about what 
constitutes a certain privileged class of reasons for acting—namely, 
the regress-stoppers, the reasons which don' t need further 
reasons—then it becomes clear that what we seek, in pursuing this 
debate, are the foundations for practical reasoning. 
Foundationalism, as traditionally conceived, goes beyond the 
mere belief in foundations—the belief, essentially, that regresses 
of argument must come to an end somewhere. Foundationalism 
includes the idea that, because we need something to stop the 
regress of reasons, there must be some kind of thing that does this. 
Or in other words, foundationalism incorporates the substantive 
thesis mentioned at the end of the last section: that whatever 
performs the function of halting regresses of argument does so in 
virtue of its (metaphysical) nature. In epistemology, the most 
popular candidate has been (some variation on) appearances. In 
the field of practical reason, there are three candidates current, 
embodied in the three theories of what gives us our practical 
reasons, summarized above: desires, values, and facts. 
Consider again the case where I have brought my grandmother 
some tea because I wanted to keep her happy, and now we wonder 
whether this was a good idea. Those Humeans who take any 
ultimate desire to give reasons to act will say that, if keeping my 
grandmother happy is an ultimate desire of mine, then it doesn't 
need defense—it stops the regress of reasons by itself. If, 
alternatively, my desire to keep my grandmother happy is not 
ultimate, but can be traced back by suitable chains of instrumental 
reasoning to ultimate desires I do have, then those desires stop the 
regress. Those ultimate desires are thus what give agents practical 
reasons, according to the Humean. 
If one believes that values give agents their normative practical 
reasons, however, one tells a somewhat different story about what 
stops the regress of reasons. If the object of my desire—namely, 
keeping my grandmother happy—is a value, or an instance of one, 
then, on this theory, the regress is stopped: I don't have to give 
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further reasons for wanting to keep my grandmother happy. It's 
valuable to do so, and there's an end to it. Or if my desire to keep 
my grandmother happy can be shown to subserve a value, as a 
means to it, for instance, then again, the regress of reasons is 
stopped once we invoke a value. 
Those who think that practical reasons are facts will probably 
think that the first, Humean position makes a mockery of serious 
practical reasoning, and they'll think the appeal to values question-
begging, metaphysically dubious, or simply misleading. What gives 
me a reason to please her will be some fact, like "she's my 
grandmother" or "I promised to." Once we cite a fact of this sort, 
this line goes, the regress is halted. Hence facts are the practical 
reasons we were seeking. 
Each of the answers to the question of what gives us reason to 
act is, in reality, a foundationalist position about practical reasons. 
Each posits some kind or type of thing which, when invoked as a 
reason, stops anyone from asking for yet another reason. But this 
sort of answer—the felt need for a kind'or type of thing to stop the 
regress of reasons—results in no small part from the way one 
frames the original debate. Remember Dancy ' s or iginal 
formulation: "these two views seem to be about the metaphysical 
ground for a reason—about what creates or generates it." When 
we frame the issue in metaphysical terms like this, it looks like 
only a metaphysical answer will provide the solution. Whatever 
has this mysterious power of grounding reasons must do so in virtue 
of its nature. Hence we look for a kind of thing which, in virtue of 
its intrinsic properties, will do what we want—namely, end a 
regress of reasons for a practical conclusion. 
At least to philosophers of a certain vaguely pragmatic cast, 
foundationalism about practical reasons results in bad methodology. 
We find ourselves hunting for a priori arguments, rather than 
looking to the actual practice of practical reasoning to understand 
how various considerations come to have the normative authority 
for us that they do. For philosophers of this persuasion, metaphysics 
feels like the wrong place to begin practical thought, but given 
foundationalism, it's the only place to begin. 
Foundationalism has another drawback. The foundationalist 
Foundationalism and the Metaphysics of Practical Reasons 57 
assumption—that the role of regress-stopper is necessarily played 
by some kind of thing—restricts the options for understanding 
practical reasons. The dispute between advocates of fact-, value-, 
and desire-based reasons is predestined, in the minds of the 
disputants, to one of three outcomes. A priori, the foundationalist 
is certain that only a kind of thing, a metaphysical type, will ground 
reasons in the way she needs. Yet this attitude forecloses all sorts 
of otherwise attractive possibilities, which remain invisible as long 
as the assumption is in place. 
As I said in the introduction, this assumption lies deep, so 
deep that it rarely gets articulated. It has taken some work to bring 
it out into the open. It embodies what Wittgenstein would call a 
"picture"—a way of looking at a subject which channels thought 
along certain paths so effortlessly that one doesn't even realize 
those paths aren't necessities. One good way to break the grip of 
such a picture is to provide an attractive a l ternat ive—to 
demonstrate just how optional, and perhaps crude, the picture is. 
That is my goal in the rest of the essay. 
Non-foundationalism about Practical Reasons 
The debate over the nature and source of our practical reasons 
isn't pointless. We need certain privileged practical reasons; we 
need something to stop regresses of argument: to end the quest for 
yet further justification and yet deeper reasons for action. 
But this is all we need. The characteristic foundationalist 
assumption, that the members of the privileged class of reasons 
stop regresses in virtue of their nature, is an extra, and ungrounded, 
requirement. Noticing this assumption allows us to try rejecting 
it, and paves the way for a non-foundationalism about practical 
reasons. 
Consider this possibility: it might be that a particular fact or 
value or attitude (we won't yet settle on which) will halt a regress 
of argument in a particular case, not due to some built-in quality 
but instead, due to the force of surrounding circumstances. That 
is, 'being a regress-stopper' might be a relational property—one 
which a fact or attitude has in virtue of its relations with various 
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other elements of the situation—rather than an intrinsic property, 
one which it has essentially, or as part of its nature. 
Call the view that regress-stopping is a relational property, 
contextual ism.16 A contextualist thinks that what stops a regress of 
argument, in a particular case, depends a great deal on the 
circumstances—on the contexts in which particular cases of 
practical reasoning go forward. In a given case, a contextualist 
will say, a premise may not be subject to challenge. But in some 
other case, it probably will. Whether or not a premise is subject to 
challenge, and hence whether a threat of regress is real, depends 
not on the intrinsic qualities of the premises but on the situations 
in which particular cases of reasoning are going forward. In 
principle, any premise can be challenged—in some context. And 
in principle, any premise can be immune from challenge—in some 
context. What can be taken for granted at one point may be 
contentious at another, and vice versa. 
The contextualist approach mirrors our actual practice of giving 
and asking for practical reasons much bet ter than the 
foundationalist approach. In ordinary discourse, any of facts, 
values, or attitudes can provide reasons to act for which no further 
reasons need be provided. It's certainly true that, at times, we feel 
free to justify our actions simply by citing a desire we have. Asked, 
"Why did you get up from the couch?" a perfectly good answer is, 
"I wanted to get some ice cream." In ordinary circumstances at 
any rate, no one will ask for further reasons. We also invoke values, 
though rarely label them as such: if someone asks me why I 'm 
stuffing envelopes, and I answer, "To protect the environment," 
the value attached to the environment goes without saying. It's 
also true that we often stop at facts. "Why did you stop at the 
intersection?" is adequately answered by, "There was a stop sign 
there." Generally speaking, no one will go on to ask what inferential 
connection we discern between the presence of stop signs and 
stopping one's car. 
In fact, a philosophically informed look at our reasoning 
supports this pluralism about practical reasons. The clue lies in 
the formal structure of practical reasoning, but I'll approach the 
issue by analyzing formal arguments in the theoretical realm. 
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Among the several promising ideas which have emerged in recent 
years from the philosophical tradition influenced by Wilfrid Sellars, 
especially through the influence of Robert Brandom's 1994 book 
Making It Explicit" is an innovative philosophy of logic. On this 
view, the vocabulary of formal logic is used to make explicit the 
inferential proprieties already present in informal reasoning. Here, 
I'll concentrate on the analysis of conditionals. 
For instance, when reasoning informally, we often say things 
like, "The cherry trees are blooming, so spring is here." To make 
this informal argument deductively valid, however, we have to 
add a conditional premise. Formally rendered, the argument is 
The cherry trees are blooming. 
If the cherry trees are blooming, then spring is here. 
Therefore, spring is here. 
It's something of a question what exactly the added premise adds. 
After all, no one who accepts the informal version of the argument 
would dispute the claim, "If the cherry trees are blooming, then 
spring is here"—they show that they believe this simply by 
accepting the informal argument. For a Sellarsian, this fact provides 
the clue to understanding conditionals in general. An if-then 
statement allows one to make explicit in language a pattern of 
inference; the if-then statement will be accepted (considered true) 
just in case the pattern of inference is accepted. Whereas, without 
this bit of logical vocabulary, one can only do something—accept 
or reject an informal inference—with it one can say what one 
does—one can put the inferential pattern into language. Thus the 
'if.. .then... ' locution is an expressive device; it allows one to talk 
about the underlying practice of informal inference. 
Those, in brief, are the thoughts behind what I'll call, following 
Brandom, an expressive theory of conditionals. I will not argue 
further for this theory, though I do think it is correct. Instead, I'll 
show how it helps us demonstrate that we treat all sorts of 
metaphysical types as practical reasons. 1 8 
The expressive theory of conditionals enables us to draw a 
distinction among types of practical reasoning. We can take any 
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bit of practical reasoning and display it as an argument. One bit 
we have seen so far is, 
I promised I would keep my grandmother happy. 
If I promised to keep my grandmother happy. TU do it. 
So, I'll keep my grandmother happy. 
Another bit of practical reasoning we have already run across is, 
Let me keep my grandmother happy. 
If I bring her some tea. I will keep mv grandmother happy. 
So, I'll bring my grandmother some tea. 
The expressive theory tells us, in each of these cases, that the 
conditional premise expresses the informal propriety of an 
inference from its antecedent to its consequent, serving only an 
explicitating role, and so does not add to the force of the argument. 
Since these arguments are equally forceful without the conditional 
premise, we could rephrase them as follows: 
I promised I would keep mv grandmother happy. 
So, I'll keep my grandmother happy. 
Let me keep mv grandmother happy. 
So, I'll bring my grandmother some tea. 
Now the difference in the arguments, and hence in the 
reasoning they reflect, should be evident. The premise of the second 
practical argument expresses a desire, or more generally, an 
attitude, while the premise of the first expresses an (ostensible) 
fact. 
So the expressive theory of conditionals reveals at least two 
different kinds of practical reasoning. Sometimes we take the facts 
of the case to provide reasons for action, as in the first case; other 
times, as in the second case, we take our attitudes to provide reasons 
for action. Taking values to provide practical reasons collapses 
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into one of the other two cases: realists will think of value as a 
special kind of fact, while those with more expressivist tendencies 1 9 
will treat claims about value as expressions of attitude. The 
pluralism of our actual practice raises the possibility that "the 
source of our reasons" is pluralistic too: that both facts and attitudes, 
in suitable cases, can stop regresses of practical argument. 
Any foundationalist, confronted with this diversity of real-
life regress-stoppers, will instinctively look for a way to reduce 
one to another. Certain things, she will say, must be assumed, or 
implied, or tacit, in one case or the other, and those are the real 
reasons for action. I suggest that this "must" is one of those 
philosophical "musts" Wittgenstein warns us about: not the result 
of investigation into the phenomena, but of a preconceived 
requirement imposed by a philosophical picture. We know why a 
foundationalist wants to say these things: because her picture is 
one of a metaphysical type, the font of normative force. The very 
possibility of contextualism, however, removes the necessity of 
that picture. The fact that ordinary practice looks like it favors the 
contextualist is reason to abandon the foundationalist picture of 
practical reasons, not to postulate hidden elements in ordinary 
practice. 
What sort of change in perspective would contextualism result 
in? If being a regress-stopper is a relational property as the 
contextualist claims, then in principle anyway, anything that can 
serve as a premise in practical reasoning can stop some regress of 
practical argument. There will be as many metaphysical kinds of 
regress-stopper as there are kinds of premise—facts, values, and 
attitudes can each, in different contexts, perform this function. It 
all depends on the circumstances of particular bits of practical 
reasoning. 
It follows that no intrinsic quality will mark out all and only 
the regress-stoppers. The debate about the nature and source of 
our practical reasons has operated under a misapprehension: that 
the function of halting regresses of argument was guaranteed by 
the nature of a special type of practical reason; hence that there 
was some general theory of these privileged practical reasons to 
be had. But if the contextualist is right, the privilege associated 
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with these practical reasons is not due to any nature. The quest for 
such a theory would rest on a false presupposition—that there is 
such a metaphysical type as a "source of reasons to act." 
Of course, we could still ask about the metaphysical classification 
of our grounding reasons. The point of these questions is changed, 
however: if we don't assume, with the foundationalist, that practical 
thought begins in metaphysics, these questions are much less 
interesting. They may classify our practical reasons, but they won't 
hold the secret to their importance. 
We can also legitimately continue to hear and offer a priori 
arguments that such-and-such a kind ofthing must, or cannot, be a 
regress-stopping practical reason. But the point of these arguments 
changes also. We will not think, with the foundationalist, that just 
because debates are inconclusive, some mystery remains about 
the sources of our practical reasons. We can stick closely to ordinary 
practice, and suppose that the sources of our practical reasons are 
pluralistic until proven otherwise. If some sound argument can 
show that one type of practical premise is barred from ever being 
a stopping point in practical reasoning, so be it. If, at the end of the 
day, there is only one candidate for the post of regress-stopper left 
standing, so be it. But those are conclusions far down the road, not 
a priori convictions we start with. 
Conclusion 
My aim is to dislodge a prejudice—at the veiy least, to expose 
the foundationalist assumption as an assumption, so that we can 
intelligently evaluate whether or not to continue thinking under 
its shadow. The central bone of contention in the debate over the 
nature and source of our practical reasons revolves around what 
can be relied upon to halt regresses of practical argument. Taking 
a position in this debate does not essentially require delving into 
the metaphysics of reasons. The very possibility of a non-
foundationalist way of understanding the sources of our practical 
reasons removes the temptation to think that there must be a general 
theory of the source of practical reasons. This in turn means that 
the foundationalist has to defend his substantive thesis—that the 
Foundationalism and the Metaphysics of Practical Reasons 63 
function of stopping regresses depends on the nature of the regress-
stoppers—as never before. If (as I suspect) that assumption does 
not prove very defensible, contextualism provides a satisfying 
theoretical alternative. In this small corner of debate, it may turn 
out as Wittgenstein desired: we can stop doing that kind of 
philosophy when we want to. 
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